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Introduction
　What is meant by denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and global 
nuclear disarmament? And how are they related to the two agendas of 
regional denuclearization and global disarmament? To a legal scholar who 
remains outside of real nuclear politics, these questions seem very difficult 
to deal with, but by recognizing these difficulties, this article tries to focus 
on a few issues of law and politics in the nuclear age.
（１）
＊ Kenji Urata has been Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law at Waseda 
University since 2005, and Vice─President of the International Association of 
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms （IALANA） since 1998. In the past he served as 
Professor of Constitutional Law, Waseda University Faculty of Law （1972─2005）, 
Visiting Professor at Lund University Faculty of Law, Sweden （2002─03）, and 
Acting Vice─president of the Asian Association of Social Science Research 
Councils （AASREC─UNESCO, Philippines, 1990─91）. His publications include 
Challenges of multi─level constitutionalism: law and politics in search of balance, 
（co─edited, Polpress, 2004）; Reflections on global constitutionalism: perspectives 
based on the constitution of Japan （Waseda University, 2005）; “The Moral 
Responsibility of the United States: Reading Barack Obama’s Prague Speech” in 
The Peace and Conflict Review （University for Peace, Fall 2009）, and “The 
Criminality of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy: From Hiroshima to 
Fukushima” in New Paradigms of Peace Research: The Asia─Pacific Context. 
（Rawat Publications, 2013）.
3. Nuclear Arms Control Under Siege
Afterword
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　I wonder if the following three items might provide some useful clues.
　First is that the threat and use of nuclear weapons are contrary to the 
right to life, and may amount to crimes under international law according 
to the UN Human Rights Committee （HRC）. On October 30, 2018 the 
HRC, which is in charge of implementing the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights （ICCPR）, adopted its General 
Comment （GC） no. 36 relating to the right to life （Article 6 ICCPR; in 
para. 66）
（２）
. The International Court of Justice （ICJ）, in its 1996 Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
confirmed the applicability of the right to life in time of armed conflict 
and, moreover, observed that the test of what is an “arbitrary deprivation 
of life” has to be determined in light of international law governing armed 
conflict, in particular humanitarian law.
（３）
（１）　The nuclear age is the era in which technological civilization, as symbolized 
by nuclear weapons and nuclear power, dominates the world. The discerning 
scientists who witnessed the successful Trinity nuclear bomb test in New Mexico 
on July 16, 1945 saw “the end of the world.” But US President Truman had already 
spoken beforehand with Britain’s Prime Minister Churchill, and decided to use the 
bomb on Japan, not on Germany. Further, the bomb’s use had to precede the 
Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan under the Yalta Agreement. Thus 
came the dropping of the uranium bomb Little Boy on Hiroshima on August 6, and 
that of the plutonium bomb Fat Man on Nagasaki on August 9. Here the ignorance 
and irresponsibility of Truman, Stimson, and other politicians and military leaders 
coexist with the knowledge and foresight of Einstein and other scientists. These 
two groups would go on to produce a striking contrast in the way they confronted 
the nuclear age.
（２）　General comment No. 36 （2018） on article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life. CCPR/C/GC/36. Advance unedited 
version − OHCHR （https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared％
20Documents/1_Global/CCPR_C_GC_36_8785_E.pdf）.
（３）　ICJ Reports 1996, § 25. （http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp─content/uploads/2011/10/
Legality─of─the─Threat─or─Use─of─Nuclear─Weapons1.pdf）.
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　Second are three statements which appeared in newspapers on August 
9, 2018, the 73rd anniversary of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Two of 
the statements were from the “declaration” by Nagasaki Mayor Taue 
Tomihisa: （1） Taue put pressure on the Abe administration to endorse the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons （TPNW, or the Nuclear 
Weapon Prohibition Treaty）. （2） Concerning crimes against humanity, 
Taue made reference to the statement by the late Tsuchiyama Hideo, who 
had been a member of the Nagasaki Peace Declaration Drafting 
Committee, that senior government officials who approve of the nuclear 
umbrella are possible accomplices in “crimes against humanity.” （3） And 
concerning Article 9 of the Constitution, which bans Japan from having 
armed forces, Tanaka Terumi, co─chairperson of the Japan Confederation 
of A─ & H─Bomb Sufferers, made an appeal for resolving conflicts using 
diplomacy based on the spirit of Article 9.
（４）
　Third, the April 27, 2018 “Panmunjom Declaration” from the summit 
meeting by the leaders of the two Koreas states that, for peace and 
prosperity, and especially for unification of the Korean Peninsula, South 
and North Korea will “actively cooperate to establish a permanent and 
solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Bringing an end to the 
current unnatural state of armistice and establishing a robust peace 
regime on the Korean Peninsula is a historical mission that must not be 
delayed any further.
（５）
” And the June 12 Joint Statement arising from the 
first US─North Korea summit stated: “1. The United States and the 
DPRK commit to establish new U.S.─DPRK relations in accordance with 
（４）　Asahi Shimbun, August 9─10, 2018.
（５）　“South and North Korea Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and 
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula” （Submitted to the United Nations General 
Assembly on September 6, 2018）, Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea.
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the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity. 2. 
The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting 
and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. 3. Reaffirming the 
April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work 
towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 4 The 
United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains 
including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.
（６）
” The 
“Panmunjom Declaration” and the US─DPRK Joint Statement have 
brought about an historic shift from military conflict to peaceful 
diplomacy for the time being.
　With these three items in mind, below I shall examine some issues 
pertaining to law and politics, such as the fundamental matters of 
constitution, international law, and crimes.
　This article comprises four parts. The first is Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula, and Recognition of Current Status in the Nuclear Age. 
The second discusses some issues on constitution, international law and 
crimes. Part 3 deals with issues pertaining to solutions for the Korean 
Peninsula’s nuclear weapons problem, and Part 4 shifts the point of view 
to introduce several aspects of issues related to global nuclear 
disarmament.
（６）　U.S.─DPRK Joint Statement （https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings─
statements/joint─statement─president─donald─j─trump─united─states─america─
chairman─kim─jong─un─democratic─peoples─republic─korea─singapore─summit/）.
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Part One 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,  
and Recognition of Current Status in the Nuclear Age
1. How Should We Interpret the US─DPRK Summit?
　The Panmunjom Declaration and the US─DPRK Joint Statement, both 
quoted above, have brought about an historic shift from military conflict 
to peaceful diplomacy for the time being.
　At the US─DPRK summit, US President Trump made substantial 
concessions to Workers’ Party of Korea Chairman Kim Jong─un that 
N o r t h K o r e a’s p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m w i l l b e g u a r a n t e e d , a n d t h a t 
denuclearization will be pursued in stages. One assessment is that the 
DPRK won “a huge victory” by simultaneously obtaining assurance that 
its political system will survive and that US─South Korea military 
exercises will be suspended.
（７）
　There is also a theory that China is the winner. Although the US 
indeed did not declare an end to the Korean War, it made a substantial 
concession by consenting to Kim Jong─un’s demand for survival of his 
political system, saying that it was working on building a new relationship 
between the US and North Korea. What is more, the US spoke only of 
making efforts toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula , and set for th no jo int unders tanding concerning a 
denuclearization framework. According to this theory, it was none other 
（７）　Okada, Takashi. “The US─North Korea Conference Was a ‘Great Victory’ for 
North Korea,” The Cross─Strait View, No. 91, published June 14, 2018 （http://
www.21ccs.jp/ryougan_okada/ryougan_93.html） （in Japanese）.
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than these abstract statements that China wanted from Trump.
（８）
　But a reading of history turns up the expression “Pyrrhic victory.
（９）
” With 
regard to facts in the game of diplomacy, if one’s only concern is who 
wins, it would be hard to say that one had assessed the facts in terms of 
history and from a broad perspective.
　My focus here is the insight that what really matters are what was not 
written into the Joint Statement, and what didn’t happen as a result of the 
US─North Korea summit. These are the insightful words of Noam 
Chomsky, who was voted the “world’s top public intellectual.” His insight 
is what I want to learn from.
（10）
　My position is that I support the Panmunjom Declaration by the 
leaders of the two Koreas, and I hope their accord is realized. That holds 
also for the Joint Statement of the US─North Korea summit. Further, my 
commentary shall proceed from the practical stance of betting on the 
hope that the agreements embodied in these diplomatic documents will be 
realized. At the same time, from an epistemological standpoint I shall try 
to ascertain the current state of and future outlook for the two Koreas, the 
Asian region, and our turbulent world in the context of the Panmunjom 
Declaration and the Joint Statement, and provide a background 
explanation for them. Finally, I will discuss what action Japanese lawyers 
（８）　Dreazen, Yochi. “The big winner of the Trump─Kim summit? China,” Vox, 
June 13, 2018 （https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/13/17458944/trump─kim─summit─
china─response─south─korea─military─drills）.
（９）　Fitzgerald, Paul and Elizabeth Gould, “The Grand Illusion of Imperial Power,” 
CounterPunch, July 27, 2018 （https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/07/27/the─grand
─illusion─of─imperial─power/）.
（10）　Polychroniou, C. J. “Noam Chomsky on Fascism, Showmanship and 
Democrats’ Hypocrisy in the Trump Era,” Truthout, June 20, 2018 （https://trutho 
ut.org/articles/noam─chomsky─on─fascism─showmanship─and─democrats─hypocrisy
─in─the─trump─era/）.
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need to take.
2. The Situation Up to the End of 2017
　Fred Fleitz works directly under National Security Advisor John 
Bolton, who had Fleitz replace National Security Council Chief of Staff 
Keith Kellogg. Fleitz, who had worked as a CIA analyst, had the 
following to say in The Coming North Korea Nuclear Nightmare: What 
Trump Must Do to Reverse Obama’s “Strategic Patience,” a book published 
last March.
　During the eight─year Obama administration the policy of “strategic 
patience” failed. This led to a situation in which the “rogue state” North 
Korea might conduct nuclear tests, develop missiles, make hydrogen 
bombs, and start thermonuclear war. To prevent this, the Trump 
administration advocated a radical change in nuclear policy. And Fleitz 
claims, for example, that the news that the US was preparing a “bloody 
nose” strike against North Korea late last year was a major factor 
persuading North Korea to change its nuclear strategy to diplomatic 
negotiations.
　If this military operation had been carried out, the world would surely 
be thinking that it was a North Korean suicide attack. The targets would 
be not only US bases in South Korea, but also US bases in Japan 
including Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, as well as main─island bases such 
as Yokota Air Base, United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Naval Air 
Facility Atsugi, and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. Nuclear power 
plants in Japan’s coastal zones would likewise be perfect targets. Striking 
them with missiles would cause catastrophic damage equal to having been 
attacked with nuclear weapons.
　In Chomsky’s view, we have for the time being avoided such a tragic 
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situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese archipelago, and the 
Okinawan islands.
（11）
　Already at the time of the presidential election, Trump had suggested 
four approaches to North Korea.
1 Direct dialog with the North Korean leader.
2 Make China apply even stronger pressure on North Korea.
3  Protect the US from North Korea using the Theater Missile Defense 
（TMD）.
4 Use of nuclear weapons against North Korea is possible.
　But Trump is not saying what means he would choose over others 
because, he says, he does not want the North Koreans to know.
（12）
 As this 
shows, President Trump has pledged that he might use nuclear weapons 
against North Korea.
Trump’s UN speech
　In his first UN speech （September 19, 2017）, Trump aimed his sharpest 
weapon at North Korea. He stated unequivocally that “if ［the US］ is 
forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally 
destroy North Korea.” He called Kim Jong─un “Rocket Man,” and said, 
（11）　Fleitz, Fred. The Coming North Korea Nuclear Nightmare: What Trump Must 
Do to Reverse Obama’s ‘Strategic Patience,’ The Center for Security Policy, March 
9, 2018. The British daily Telegraph also reported on the “bloody nose” operation 
on December 20, 2017. Primarily it would have involved destroying North Korea’s 
missile launchers, and attacking arsenals where missiles are stored. But an 
operation to assassinate Kim Jong─un by means of a plot would itself be a serious 
war crime.
（12）　Glaser, Alexander and Zia Mian. “Japan and U.S. Nuclear Arms Control and 
Disarmament Policy Under the Trump Administration: A Look into the Cloudy 
Crystal Ball”, The Asia─Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Volume 15, Issue 8, Number 
2, Apr 15, 2017. （https://apjjf.org/─Alexander─Glaser──Zia─Mian/5028/article.pdf）.
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“Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.
（13）
” 
“Totally destroy” here is not limited to conventional weapons because 
Trump does not exclude the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. This is 
attested by the National Security Strategy released in December 2017.
（14）
　The US─North Korea Summit catalyzed the great historic shift from 
such military operations to diplomatic negotiations.
　Joseph Gerson, who has been continuously active with the American 
Friends Service Committee since 1976, offered an appropriate and precise 
assessment when he wrote, “We should appreciate South Korean 
President Moon Jae─in’s inspired Olympic diplomacy and that the 
Singapore summit prevented ─ at least for the t ime being ─ a 
catastrophic war by walking Trump back from his incendiary fire and fury 
nuclear threats. The summit also made it possible for Seoul and 
Pyongyang to proceed in ‘determining the destiny of the Korean nation 
on their own accord.
（15）
’”
　One is reminded of the colonial domination of Korea by the Empire of 
Japan starting in 1910, and the 1950 Korean War, for which the use of 
nuclear weapons was considered, and which involved the “United Nations 
Command” （actually led by the US Empire） and the People’s Republic of 
（13）　Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, The White House, September 19, 2017 （https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings─statements/remarks─president─trump─72nd─session─
united─nations─general─assembly/）.
（14）　A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, The White House, 
December 18, 2017 （https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/new─national─security─
strategy─new─era/）.
（15）　Gerson, Joseph. “Remembering the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in Perilous Times.” Truthout, August 6, 2018 （https://Truthout.org/
articles/remembering─the─bombings─of─hiroshima─and─nagasaki─in─perilous─
times/）.
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China People’s Volunteer Army. In September 1991 after the Cold War, 
both Koreas joined the United Nations, and now, in the 21st century, the 
peninsula is still divided into two states, while the North has armed itself 
with nuclear weapons. There is also the hope that Japan and North Korea 
will normalize their relations. Indeed these historical facts are major issues 
which underlay the US─North Korea summit. How is the situation 
perceived if these facts and issues are interpreted from the perspective of 
the biggest challenges of the nuclear age?
3. Behind “Denuclearization and Guaranteeing Peace”
Two minutes before extinction of the human race
　These are extremely dangerous times for humanity. According to 
Joseph Gerson, this is, in its entirety, closely connected with the US 
continuation of preparations for a nuclear war that would wipe out 
humanity. This past winter the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set its 
Doomsday Clock to two minutes to midnight （i.e., human extinction）, 
which is “the closest to apocalyptic nuclear war since 1953 and worse than 
during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.” Gerson makes the following 
statements, which aid the background awareness of nuclear issues. Let’s 
look at a few paragraphs.
（16）
The threat to China and Russia
　One is the threat perceived by China and Russia. Gerson writes, “The 
Pentagon budget has been increased by an amount equal to Russia’s total 
military budget. Despite Trump’s embrace of Putin, the Pentagon’s new 
National Strategy prioritizes preparations for great power war against 
China or Russia ─ the two countries military leaders believe threaten 
（16）　Ibid.
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‘American power, influence and interests.’”
　He continues with this statement on the urge by the US Empire to 
make vassal states of allies.
　“This explains the $1.2 trillion spending plan for the new generation of 
US offensive nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and Trump’s 
new ‘Space Command’ to dominate Earth from space.”
　So, what is Trump up to? “As we saw in Trump’s theatrical summitry 
with Kim Jong Un and with his trade war tariffs and denunciation of the 
European Union, in Trump’s ‘America First’ empire, the only good allies 
are those who know their proper place as vassals.”
　I am reminded here of “Operation Unthinkable,” which would have 
involved launching “World War Three” against the Soviet Union by the 
US, Britain, and Germany. On May 22, 1945, shortly after the German 
surrender, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill instructed the Joint 
Planning Staff to prepare a plan for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union.
（17）
　This deep─seated anti─communist orientation reminds one of when the 
Entente Powers carried out a large─scale war of intervention in a bid to 
topple Lenin’s Bolshevik government, which had been formed in the 
Russian October Revolution of 1917. Britain, France, the US, and Japan 
believed it was necessary to defend the capitalist system against this 
government, and they launched a large─scale war to support the anti─
Bolshevik White forces. The Bolshevik government barely won this “War 
to Defend the Motherland.”
A reflection of fear: 
　Let’s return to the post─WWII period. The issue here is Gerson’s 
（17）　Walker, Jonathan. Churchill’s Third World War: British Plans to Attack the 
Soviet Empire, 1945, The History Press, 2017.
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recognition of what comes after the June 2018 Singapore summit meeting. 
About this reflection of fear, he says, “As we think about North Korea’s 
nuclear arsenal and the threat it poses to Japan, South Korea and other 
countries, we need to recognize that it reflects fear.” He also remarks on 
the “trauma” that begot North Korea’s nuclear weapons: “Even as we 
crit ic ize Pyongyang’s hideous human rights record, we need to 
acknowledge that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons grew from the trauma of 
Japanese conquest and colonialism, the devastating Korean War, US and 
South Korean regime change commitments, repeated US preparations and 
threats of first─strike nuclear attacks, and the failures of US diplomacy.”
　Underlying the development of nuclear weapons by the Roosevelt 
administration was, in accordance with a proposal by Einstein, acquiring 
them before Nazi Germany developed them. But although Hitler had 
received a report on the possibility of an atomic bomb in 1942, an 
insufficiency of funds to prosecute the war induced him to abandon the 
idea of making one in the second half of 1944. The Roosevelt administration 
found out that the German atomic bomb threat was not real, but, having 
ascertained that nuclear weapons have unprecedented destructive power, 
and taking advantage of the fear they would induce, the administration ─ 
with the Soviet Union in mind ─ decided to use them as a means to 
dominate the postwar world. The subsequent determination of a policy by 
the Truman administration to use nuclear weapons against Japan instead 
of Germany was likewise meant to take advantage of this fear to establish 
a world order for global conquest.
Repeated mistakes by US administrations
　But Gerson itemizes the mistakes: “Add to this the Clinton and Bush I’s 
failures to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework, Bush II’s vetoing Kim 
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Dae─jung’s Sunshine policy and rejection of the comprehensive 
agreement negotiated by former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, 
and the Obama administration’s ‘benign neglect.’”
　Concerning the significance of maintaining the Kim dynasty and North 
Korea’s independence, Gerson cites former Defense Secretary William 
Perry, who was involved in negotiations, and historian Bruce Cumings: 
“As Perry and the renowned historian Bruce Cumings explain, the 
purposes of North Korea’s nuclear program are to preserve the Kim 
dynasty and the country’s independence.
　Opinions are divided among the involved Americans regarding the 
truth of these two statements of opinion, but I lack the time for a detailed, 
empirical examination. However, at this time my feelings closely coincide 
with Gerson’s clearly stated position.
Negotiations on “denuclearization and guaranteeing peace”
　Tensions are currently a problem for diplomacy in the Trump 
administration. National Security Advisor John Bolton, who advocates 
the “Libya method,” says that North Korea must completely denuclearize 
within one year, while on the other hand Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo, who suggested using the “Vietnam method,” said that 
meaningful progress must be made within two years. Meanwhile, Trump 
says that for the time being there is no hurry.
　In response, Kim Jong─un immediately rejected Pompeo’s demand that 
North Korea enact serious denuclearization measures before the US 
relaxes its sanctions. At the same time, he demanded that the armistice 
agreement between North Korea and the US be changed to a peace treaty 
before he makes any major concessions.
　Incidentally, former Los Alamos Director Siegfried S. Hecker, who has 
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intimate knowledge of North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure, claims that it 
would take 15 years to completely destroy it.
（18）
　According to Hecker, “［DPRK diplomats］ said their buildup would be 
of ‘limited duration’ until better relations with US were possible. They 
envisioned three stages in response to the US removing the nuclear threat 
and ending sanctions: a freeze on nuclear weapons development, disabling 
key facilities and nuclear weapons, and mutual diplomatic recognition.”
　Upon consideration, starting negotiations for denuclearization with the 
enforcement of the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of December 31, 1991 is 
recommended by experts, and I too strongly support this. Negotiations 
based on the principle of the two Koreas’ national independence will 
perhaps serve as the springboard for three─party negotiations including 
China. Meanwhile, US─North Korea negotiations meant to give tangible 
form to the US─North Korea Joint Statement will probably be conducted 
on a level which includes high─ranking government officials, diplomats, 
and experts. It is too early to know whether the six─party talks including 
Russia will be revived. For the time being, however, there is no hope for 
the start of direct negotiations between Japan and North Korea because 
the difficulty of finding a solution to the abduction issue is holding both 
countries back. This is the matter they must deal with first.
Nuclear weapons abolition and nuclear nonproliferation
　The three statements I saw on the 73rd anniversary of the atomic 
bombing of Nagasaki concerned （1） the Nuclear Weapon Prohibition 
Treaty, （2） crimes against humanity, and （3） Article 9, which says that 
（18）　Broad, William J. and Sanger, David E. “North Korea Nuclear Disarmament 
Could Take 15 Years, Expert Warns,” The New York Times, May 28, 2018.
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Japan shall have no war potential. The people who made these statements 
give priority to abolishing nuclear weapons over nuclear nonproliferation, 
and they represent the hibakusha. I myself think that the world’s nuclear 
victims, especially the atomic bombing victims, are an invaluable asset to 
the nuclear weapons abolition movement, and even more so to humanity.
　Seen from this perspective, the Joint Statement issued at the US─North 
Korea summit meeting might contribute to nuclear nonproliferation, but it 
will certainly do nothing to abolish nuclear weapons. On the other hand, 
even though the Panmunjom Declaration by the leaders of the two 
Koreas did not specify exactly the methods and time periods for 
denuclearization, this does not mean that public opinion and movements 
aspiring to nuclear weapons abolition do not underlie the declaration. If 
North Korea too signs and ratifies the Nuclear Weapon Prohibition 
Treaty, it would be able to act in solidarity with the nuclear weapons 
abolition movement of the hibakusha and nonaligned nations.
Part Two 
Constitution, International Law and Crimes
1.  The United States’ Manhattan Project and the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons development
　Constitution: Early in 1939, the world’s scientific community discovered 
that German physicists had learned the secrets of splitting the uranium 
atom. Scientists Albert Einstein, who fled Nazi persecution, and Enrico 
Fermi, who escaped Fascist Italy, were now living in the United States. 
Einstein penned a letter to President Roosevelt urging the development of 
an atomic research program later that year. Roosevelt saw neither the 
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necessity nor the utility for such a project, but secretly agreed to proceed 
slowly. In late 1941, the American effort to design and build an atomic 
bomb received its code name ─ the Manhattan Project.
（19）
　The Manhattan Project, which spanned the years from 1942 to 1946, 
imbued US domestic laws. First, there was military secrecy. This allowed 
the president, who is also the commander─in─chief of the nation’s armed 
forces, to pursue war outside the confines of the constitution. Next was 
the mobilization of more than 130,000 scientists, engineers, and workers, 
and also the expenditure of $2 bill ion on building technological 
civilization, thereby creating the prototype of the military─industrial 
complex. The military, the government, and private enterprises formed a 
national─security conglomerate under a veil of secrecy. It was under this 
regime of control that, with an eye on the postwar global strategy against 
the Soviet Union, the decision was made to use the atomic bombs. The 
Japanese Empire, which revered the emperor, was chosen as the target of 
the bombs, and the hibakusha were deemed the sacrifice. Would not an 
apology and reparations by the US ─ the “bombing state” ─ be in order 
to revive human civilization and recover human dignity? The fact is that 
the US political constitution was deconstructed by the Manhattan 
Project, which formed an unofficial constitution, and that the US has had 
a dual constitution, one of which is dominated by a national─security 
conglomerate under a veil of secrecy.
（20）
　Nuclear weapons development by the Soviet Union was likewise 
conducted under strict secrecy, based on intelligence obtained from 
（19）　The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Manhattan Project,” Last Updated: 
January 9, 2019 （https://www.britannica.com/event/Manhattan─Project）.
（20）　On a theoretical genesis of a dual constitution, see Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual 
State : A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship, E.A. Shills and Introduction 
by Jens Meierhenrich. （Oxford university press, 2017: first edition1941）.
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scientists who participated in the Manhattan Project. The USSR 
prioritized investment of funds, industrial capacity, and human resources 
for nuclear weapons development. It also used prisoners to extract 
uranium ore from old mines in the former Czechoslovakia. Here too, 
nuclear weapons silenced the law. Although we have partial knowledge 
about the machinations and spy networks used by international bankers 
to block a US monopoly on nuclear weapons, the true story is still 
unknown even since the Soviet Union’s breakup.
（21）
2. What Is the Korean War in the Context of Japan’s History?
　International Law: The approximately 45─year Meiji era （1868−1912） 
coincides roughly with what historian Eric Hobsbawm called “The Age of 
Capital” （1848−1878） and “The Age of Empire” （1878−1914）. To Japan, it 
was “The Age of War.” Japan “dumped Asia and joined Europe,” and 
imported the German constitution. It also fought the Sino─Japanese War 
and the Russo─Japanese War, which were by nature proxy wars over the 
hegemony of the UK and the US. Seen from another perspective, India 
under the East India Company’s rule, Qing China from the second half of 
the 19th century through the early 20th century, and others were typical 
parts of the unofficial British Empire.
（22）
（21）　Secret Cities Of The Manhattan Project: Declassified Research Documents! 
（https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7urGJYBmYI）.
From Major Jordan’s Diaries ─ The Truth about the US and USSR （https://archive.
org/stream/FromMajorJordansDiaries─TheTruthAboutTheUsAndUssr/FromMajor 
JordansDiaries─TheTruthAboutTheUsAndUssr_djvu.txt）.
（22）　Gallander, John and Robinson, Ronald. “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The 
Economic History Review, second series, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1953. This theory 
overturned the classical view of empire propounded by Hobson and Lenin, in 
which political domination and economic units coincide, and heavily influenced 
Wallerstein and his world systems theory.
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　Several events happened under the Meiji Imperial Government, 
including the argument for conquering Korea, which was supposed to 
have opened Korea with military force,
（23）
 the Taiwan Expedition, and the 
Ganghwa Island Incident, which led to the signing of the Japan─Korea 
Treaty of 1876. Later, Japan and Korea entered into the Japan─Korea 
Treaty （August 1910）, in which the Empire of Japan annexed the Korean 
Empire.
（24）
　The legal aspects of the colonial issue involve a global controversy over 
the legality and validity of the 1910 Japan─Korea Annexation Treaty. 
There was an international conference dealing with this matter, and one 
theory posits that, owing to a strong initiative by South Korea, it was held 
with the intent of eliciting international recognition of South Korea’s 
claim that the treaty was illegal. But for reasons including the lack of 
support by British experts on international law for the theory that illegal 
means invalid, it was not possible to obtain an international consensus 
that the treaty was illegal as well as invalid. University of Derby professor 
Anthony Carty argued that, at the time of the treaty, there is doubt even 
as to whether international law existed, and that it was difficult to find a 
law that was sufficient to determine whether a certain treaty was legal or 
not. Cambridge University professor James Crawford apparently observed 
（23）　The call for a punitive military expedition against Korea arose when Meiji 
Japan notified Korea that a new Japanese government had been established, and 
sought diplomatic relations, but Korea sought to keep its borders closed and 
refused. Behind this lay the interpretation of the ancient Japanese texts Kojiki and 
Nihon Shoki to mean that ancient Japan had the right of dominion over the Korean 
Peninsula, because of which some Japanese advocated an expedition to Korea. 
This thinking was also incorporated into the Sonnō─Jōi （“Revere the Emperor and 
Expel the Barbarians”） movement.
（24）　Caprio, Mark. Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910−1945. 
University of Washington Press, 2009, pp. 82−83.
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that in view of the customary international law of the day, the treaty 
could not be called “invalid” even if there had been major procedural flaws 
because it was recognized by Britain, the US, and other powers.
（25）
　However, these professors’ theories were aligned with the current of 
thought which legalized colonial rule by the British Empire. In today’s 
world, where the responsibility for colonial rule is being called to account, 
it stands to reason that the theory advocated by former Japanese colony 
South Korea would challenge the international law interpretation which 
defends imperialism. This is an achievement of Japan─South Korea joint 
research based on the stance that illegal means null and void.
（26）
　The approximately 106─year period （1912−2018） comprising Japan’s 
Taisho, Showa, and Heisei eras coincides with the age of Pax Americana, 
although Japan’s modern history cannot be clearly demarcated by this 
term because there is a complicated relationship with the imperial powers 
including the UK, US, and France, as well as Germany and Italy. The 
capitalist world and socialist countries were convulsed by two world wars. 
With the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese military 
surrendered unconditionally in the Asia─Pacific War, and the Empire of 
Japan surrendered to the Allies （September 2, 1945）.
　By means of military power with a monopoly on nuclear weapons and a 
political and economic strategy which included “liberating colonies,” the 
（25）　“Conference to discuss legality of the treaty, in Japan−Korea Treaty of 1910” 
（https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan％E2％80％93Korea_Treaty_of_1910）.
（26）　Sasakawa, Norikatsu and Yi Tae─jin, eds. and auths. Korea Annexation and 
the Present Era: Reexamination and International Joint Research Based on History 
and International Law, Tokyo, Akashi Shoten, December 2008 （in Japanese）; 
Sasakawa, Norikatsu and Byeon Yeongho, gen. eds., Do Jong─hwan, ed. and auth. 
One Hundred Years since the Forced Annexation of Korea: History and Unfinished 
Business ─ International Joint Research, Tokyo, Akashi Shoten, August 2013 （in 
Japanese）.
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US reorganized the British Empire’s global hegemony system and made 
itself into the hegemon. Allies such as the USSR, China, and India were 
then excluded from the Treaty of Peace with Japan （Treaty of San 
Francisco） with the US, UK, and other Western nations. Because this 
came under the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, 
this time period is also known as the “peace era” in Japanese history, but 
to Okinawa it is the “American age.” Therefore, Japan under the US 
occupation was a de facto participant in the Korean War, and profited 
from the “special procurement benefit.”
3. A Legal Critique of the Korean War
　Why was the Japanese Empire’s colony of Korea bisected? There are 
several possible theories,
（27）
 but the division of Korea could be seen as the 
initial maneuver in the US strategy to contain the Soviet Union in Asia, 
which came at about the time of the Japanese Empire’s surrender. In early 
research one can find the assertion that the US and USSR had agreed in 
advance on the 38th parallel, but it is now maintained that no such 
agreement was made at any meeting of the Allies, including the Yalta 
Conference. At the October 19─30, 1943 Moscow Conference attended by 
the foreign ministers of the US, UK, and USSR, it was decided, with 
regard to the occupation and governing of “enemy states” such as Japan, 
Germany, and Italy, that even among the Allied Powers, the nation that 
directly occupied an enemy state militarily would have full control in 
running its occupation. Shortly thereafter at the Cairo Conference, the 
（27）　Cumings, Bruce. Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1 （Princeton University 
Press, 1981）. Although North Korea insists that South Korea started the war by 
invading the North, other theories are that it was a civil war for reunification, or 
that it just happened. Cumings’ book sparked this controversy, and is called 
“revisionist” by scholars in the field.
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leaders of the US, UK, and the Republic of China recognized Korea’s 
independence （Cairo Declaration, November 27, 1943）. However, in a 
private meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin during the Yalta 
Conference （February 8, 1945）, Roosevelt sought agreement from Stalin 
that a trusteeship of Korea would have to last at least 20 to 30 years. But 
no mention was ever made of dividing Korea. Stalin replied that the 
shorter the trusteeship period, the better, and that he was not thinking of 
dividing the country.
（28）
　However, on August 9, 1945 the Soviet Union launched an invasion in 
the northern part of the Korean Peninsula based on the Yalta Agreement. 
To prevent a situation in which the Soviet military alone occupied the 
Korean peninsula, it was decided that the US would propose dividing and 
occupying the peninsula to the USSR. The Americans hastily developed a 
proposal in the State─War─Navy Coordinating Committee to provisionally 
divide the country at 38 degrees north latitude, and it was approved by 
President Truman. MacArthur presented the proposal to the Soviets, and 
on August 16 Stalin gave his tacit consent. On the following day, it was 
determined under General Order No. 1 that Japanese troops north of the 
38th parallel would surrender to Soviet forces （the Red Army）, and those 
to its south would surrender to American forces. This order was 
communicated to Japan, which had accepted the Potsdam Declaration, 
and in Japan, after the signing of surrender documents on September 2, 
the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to follow this course of action.
　The US in September 1947 resolved to pursue the matter of forming a 
Korean Government in the UN framework. Under UNGA Res 112 （II） of 
November 14, 1947 the UN General Assembly established the UN 
Temporary Commission on Korea （UNTCOK） that was to observe 
（28）　Ibid.
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elections for a Korean National Assembly. Because the Soviet Union 
disputed the General Assembly’s competence to observe the elections （see 
Art. 107 UN Charter）, the USSR refused to cooperate with what it 
regarded as an illegal body, and elections were held on May 10, 1948 in 
South Korea alone.
　In 1948, amid the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union, the 
Korean Peninsula became two countries: the Republic of Korea （ROK, 
usually known as South Korea, August 15） and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea （DPRK, usually known as North Korea, September 9）. 
At that time the UN supported the US, and also intervened in South 
Korean elections.
　In the Korean War （1950−1953） a multinational force consisting 
primarily of the US military went into action as the “United Nations 
Command” （UNC） under a UN General Assembly resolution. At the 
same time the People’s Republic of China, which had been founded only a 
short time prior on October 1, 1949, also entered the war with the People’s 
Volunteer Army as its battle force. Between the US and South Korea 
there was the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 1950.
　The three─year war exacted tragic sacrifices and colossal monetary 
losses from the soldiers of the involved countries, including North Korea 
and China, and South Korea and the US, as well as on innocent 
noncombatants. Although this article will not delve into that matter, the 
Jeju Island atrocity followed from the decision about north─south division 
and elections; the decision by the Security Council to go to war, 
entrusting full military and political powers to the US on its behalf, was 
probably a breach of its own charter and thus illegal. Also the UN 
destruction of dams, dykes, and livelihood infrastructure should be seen as 
criminal, perhaps genocidal.
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　An armistice─signing ceremony was held on July 27, 1953. The 
agreement was signed by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander 
of the United Nations Command; Peng Dehuai, commander of the China 
People’s Volunteer Army; and Kim Il─sung, supreme commander of the 
Korean People’s Army. South Korea did not join the agreement. The 
battle line at the time of the armistice, which was near the 38th parallel, 
was thus recognized as the Military Demarcation Line.
　But because this was not the end of the war, nominally the parties are 
still at war; the United Nations Command was not disbanded and still 
exists, and peace treaties have not been concluded between the two 
Koreas or between North Korea and the US. In this war China expedited 
the modernization of its military by means of the Sino─Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. China entered into the Sino─
North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty with North 
Korea, and that relationship has lasted for over 50 years. However, China’
s alliance with the USSR was dissolved a few years later owing to the 
Sino─Soviet split. This changing environment led North Korea to 
systematize its Juche （self─reliance） ideology. Meanwhile, the Mutual 
Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea was 
signed in October 1953 and entered into force in November 1954.
Crimes
　Three kinds of crimes could be mentioned here.
One: United Nations Activities
　This extends from the legality of Security Council Resolutions 82, 83, 
and 84 （1950）, to General Assembly competence in the area of maintaining 
peace and security, and jus in bello questions on further legal development 
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including Security Council voting procedure. If the UN is guilty of 
multiple illegalities in its interventions in Korea 1947─1953, it is natural to 
proceed by asking about the implications of United Nations criminality.
（29）
Two: War Crimes
　With regard to the Korean War, I want to make special mention of 
Curtis LeMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command. He relentlessly 
conducted indiscriminate bombings of North Korean cities, agricultural 
dams, and rural areas, and caused the deaths of 2 million people, 
corresponding to 20％ of the population. This number is far greater than 
the 500,000 people killed in his scorched─earth tactics on Japanese cities.
（30）
　In April 1951, Commander─in─Chief of the United Nations Command 
Douglas MacArthur proposed to President Truman that the US use the 
atomic bombs on Mainland China to attack China and the USSR, which 
were behind North Korea, but Truman did not permit the use of the 
bombs.
（31）
 His reasoning was that atomic bombs at that time exploded above 
ground, and were not suited to destroying railroads, tunnels, bridges, and 
the like, which limited their military effectiveness. And there were other 
reasons such as: There was a danger of total war with China and the 
（29）　Constantin, Dana, “Korean War （1950─53）.” Published under the auspices of 
the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law under the 
direction of Rüdiger Wolfrum. last updated: October 2015 （http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law─9780199231690─e57）.
（30）　Harden, Blaine. “The U.S. war crime North Korea won’t forget,” Washington 
Post, March 24, 2015 （https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the─us─war─
crime─north─korea─wont─forget/2015/03/20/fb525694─ce80─11e4─8c54─ffb5ba6f2f69_
story.html?noredirect=on）.
（31）　“Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War,” Constitutional Rights Foundation, 
Summer 2001 （http://www.crf─usa.org/bill─of─rights─in─action/bria─17─3─b─truman─
macarthur─and─the─korean─war.html）.
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USSR, and if atomic bombs were used against China following their use in 





　In March 1952, the IADL issued a Report on U.S. Crimes in Korea 
dur ing the Korean War. S igns of the Times s tates , “The IADL 
Commission unanimously found that the United States was guilty of 
crimes against humanity during the Korean War and that there was a 
pattern of behaviour which constitutes genocide.” It goes on to quote the 
conclusion of the 2001 Korea International War Crimes Tribunal:
The Members of the International War Crimes Tribunal find the 
accused Guilty on the basis of the evidence against them: each of the 
nineteen separate crimes alleged in the Initial Complaint has been 
established to have been committed beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Members find these crimes to have occurred during three main periods 
in the U.S. intervention in and occupation of Korea.
（33）
Part Three 
For a Solution to the Korean Peninsula’s  
Nuclear Weapons Problem
1. Status review and Challenges
　In July of 2017, the Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty was adopted at 
（32）　“Why did President Truman dismiss General MacArthur?” Harry S. Truman 
Library & Museum （https://www.trumanlibrary.org/trivia/macarth.htm）.
（33）　American forces guilty of genocide in the Korean War according to 1952 IADL 
report, June 4, 2018 （https://www.sott.net/article/387570─American─forces─guilty─
of─genocide─in─the─Korean─War─according─to─1952─IADL─report）.
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the UN headquarters in New York, and a campaign seeking its entry into 
force is now in progress. But the nuclear powers （P5）, as well as the 
military alliance comprising NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and 
others, which reside under the nuclear umbrella, oppose the treaty itself. 
North Korea has continued nuclear tests and missile launches in 
opposition to the attitude taken by this alliance. UN Secretary─General 
António Guterres issued a red alert to the world in his New Year’s 
Address, but at the beginning of the year talks were held between the two 
Koreas. Will there be a freeze on nuclear testing and missile launches by 
North Korea, and a freeze on US─South Korea joint military exercises? If 
both are realized, we may see a new phase in which the world accepts a 
nuclear─armed North Korea. But perhaps it would be said that this is mere 
wishful thinking, the stated reason being that the nuclear superpower 
America, which leads the “real world of nuclear weapons,” will dismiss out 
of hand Obama’s wish for a world free of nuclear weapons, and start a 
long─term nuclear arms race. 
　How should legal experts operating under the Japanese Constitution 
regard this situation? It seems to me that the social responsibility of legal 
experts is being put to the test once again. Karaki Junzo, a recipient of the 
Japan Art Academy Prize, penned A Memorandum on the “Social 
Responsibility of Scientists” （Chikuma Shobo, 1980） in the last few years 
of his life. Some time later C. G. Weeramantry, who would subsequently 
become a judge of the International Court of Justice, likewise called for a 
ban on nuclear weapons research and inquired into the soc ia l 
responsibility of scientists in his book Nuclear Weapons and Scientific 
Responsibility （Longwood, 1987）. With these facts in mind, I would like 
to closely examine the matter set forth in the title.
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2. On the Matter of Nuclear Arms on the Korean Peninsula
Juche ideology, nuclear tests, and missile development
　After the fighting ceased, the US military did not withdraw as 
stipulated in the Armistice Agreement, instead deploying tactical nuclear 
weapons in South Korea and remaining there. The conduct and 
continuation of ROK─US joint military exercises in conjunction with 
nuclear forces has heightened the tension between the US and North 
Korea. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech denouncing 
Stalin. Following that event, the Sino─Soviet split became apparent.
　Juche ideology: It was in this context that the thesis saying North 
Korea’s guiding principle is Juche ideology emerged. It is an ideology 
which sees the true nature of human beings as independence, creativity, 
and consciousness, and which seeks to establish a socialist society that 
brings about the flowering and development of human nature.
（34）
 But in 
reality it combined with the military─first policy. This policy puts the 
military before the party and the state, and regards the Korean People’s 
Army as the main force for building socialism. The constitutional 
amendment of 2009 expressly stated that the military─first policy is a 
guiding ideology along with Juche ideology.
　Nuclear testing: In 1956 North Korea reached a basic accord with the 
USSR on nuclear power development, and sent several scientists to that 
country’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. The USSR 
provided North Korea with the IRT─2000 nuclear research reactor, a small 
experimental nuclear reactor which was built in Yongbyon. In 1962 North 
（34）　Kamakura, Takao. Korean Peninsula: Reading the Crisis of War, Hakuhosha, 
p. 189, 2010, Part II, “Theory and Thought,” also deals with this.
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Korea decided on a full─out effort to develop nuclear weapons, and the 
following year it asked the Soviets to help, but the Soviets maintained the 
position that their cooperation for nuclear power was limited to peaceful 
use. However, North Korea was dead set on having nuclear weapons, and 
in 1964 it sought assistance from China, which had atomic bombs, but was 
again turned down.
（35）
　Incidentally, it is asserted that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
can be divided into the following four stages using the nuclear weapon 
type as the criterion. First stage: Basic knowledge acquisition and training 
（1956−1980）. Second stage: Implementation of a domestic plutonium 
production program （1980−1994）. Third stage: The time period during 
which the plutonium program was frozen （however, North Korea secretly 
worked on uranium enrichment; 1994−2002）. Fourth stage: The period up 
to the present, in which North Korea openly resumed nuclear activities 
（2002−present）. The North currently claims that its hydrogen bomb 
testing was a total success.
　Missile development: North Korea’s missile development garnered 
attention with a 1993 experiment in which it launched the medium─range 
ballistic missile （MRBM） Rodong─1 （Hwasong─7） toward the Sea of 
Japan. It was thought to have fallen into the sea about 350 km north of 
Japan’s Noto Peninsula, but later it was suggested that it might have 
flown over Japan and fallen into the Pacific Ocean. Another claimed 
intent of this experiment was that it was to show Iran the missile’s 
reliability, and trade the Rodong for Iranian oil. On June 11, about two 
（35）　Lee, Jae─Bong. “US Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea & 
North Korea’s Nuclear Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.” The Asia─Pacific Journal, February 17, 2009, Volume 7, Issue 8, 
Number 3 （https://apjjf.org/─Lee─Jae─Bong/3053/article.html）.
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weeks after the launch, the US and North Korea issued a Joint Statement 
in which North Korea stated its intention to continue abiding by the Non─
Proliferation Treaty （NPT）.
　At the time of the 2006 tests, there were 200 missiles. North Korea said 
that in a mine shaft it was systematically producing rockets with a 1,500─
km range. In April 2012 North Korea said that the purpose of Bright Star─
3 Unit 1 was to launch a satellite, and it argued that the Outer Space 
Treaty, which promises its parties equal use of space for peaceful 
purposes, takes precedence over the UNSC resolution that forbids missile 
launches by North Korea.
　Following the 2016 launches, 2017 brought the launches of Hwasong─
12, Hwasong─14, and Hwasong─15. Hawsong─15 was launched in the 
predawn hours of November 29. It reached an altitude of 4,475 km and 
traveled a distance of 950 km, coming down inside Japan’s exclusive 
economic zone in the Sea of Japan. It attained an altitude of about 4,500 
km, which was the highest for a North Korean ballistic missile, but if it 
had been launched along a normal trajectory, its range would have been 
13,000 km. It is said to be the first North Korean ballistic missile to be 
within range of the entire United States, including the eastern seaboard. 
Hwasong─15 can carry a very large nuclear warhead, and North Korea 
declared this to be “the completion of the nation’s nuclear force.”
　On the afternoon of the 29th the United Nations Security Council held 
a public emergency meeting. At the meeting, US Ambassador to the UN 
Nikki Haley pointed out that this ICBM launch “brings us closer to war.” 
She warned that if it comes to war “the North Korean regime will be 
utterly destroyed,” once again showing that the US would not rule out the 
use of military force. She demanded cutting off diplomatic and trade 
relations, and limiting military, scientific, technological, and commercial 
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cooperation with North Korea in an effort to isolate that country. She also 
called upon the UN to cut off North Korea’s voting rights and other 
privileges in the UN, and asked other countries to fully implement 
existing sanction resolutions. In response, China’s Deputy Permanent 
Representative Ambassador Wu Haitao expressed concerns about and 
opposition to the missile launches, but also emphasized the importance of 
a diplomatic solution through dialog. China and Russia once again 
proposed a halt to US─South Korean joint military exercises in exchange 
for a halt to North Korea’s missile development.
（36）
3.  Toward a Solution for the Korean Peninsula Nuclear 
Weapons Issue
　December 12, 1985: North Korea accedes to the nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty （NPT） but does not complete a safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency （IAEA）. Under Article III of the 
NPT, North Korea has 18 months to conclude such an arrangement. In 
subsequent years, North Korea links adherence to this provision of the 
treaty to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.
　January 20, 1992: The two Koreas s ign the South─North Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the 
declaration, both countries agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess 
nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” They also agree 
to mutual inspections for verification.
（37）
（36）　UNS/RES/2397, December 22, 2017.
（37）　Chronology of U.S.─North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, by Kelsey 
Davenport, Arms Control Association, December 2018 （https://www.armscontrol.
org/）.
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Korean nuclear crisis （I） 1993−1994
　Here I want to review the background and breakdown of the 1994 US─
North Korea Agreed Framework. Against the backdrop of the 1991 
collapse of the Cold War system, US satellite photographs gave cause for 
suspicions about North Korean nuclear development in 1993. On 
February 9, International Atomic Energy Agency （IAEA） Director─
General Hans Blix called for a special inspection in North Korea. In 
March Kim Il─sung announced North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, 
and a hair─trigger crisis situation ensued. But the US and North Korea 
reached an agreement at a meeting in Geneva on October 21, 1994. 
America’s strategic objectives were having the DPRK freeze the nuclear 
development program it had been running up to that time; replacing 
heavy water reactors, which produce plutonium, with light water 
reactors, which present little concern for nuclear proliferation; and 
gradually proceeding toward the normalization of relations between the 
US and DPRK. This agreement was neither a treaty that required 
approval of the US Senate, nor a legally binding administrative 
agreement, but it was a bilateral nonbinding political commitment to 
which the UNSC pays attention. But by the time it was signed by Kang 
Sok─ju and Robert Galicia, the Korean nuclear crisis （I） （1993−1994） and 
the grave situation described below had occurred. North Korea made 
known its intention to withdraw from the NPT and delivered the required 
90─day advance notice （actually it suspended the withdrawal notification 
on the 89th day）. The US had announced a plan for a military buildup in 
nearby countries including Japan and South Korea, and for using military 
force to bomb the Yongbyon nuclear facility. On this occasion the 
Japanese people’s right to know was also infringed because Japan’s Prime 
Minister Hata Tsutomu asked the US not to announce their plan for 
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military action to the Japanese.
　After this came the February 1995 release of the Nye Report, which 
sought market democracy and market opening from North Korea. Then 
in 2000 came the Armitage Report （I）, which directed Japan to conduct 
national emergency legislation. Based on the argument that North Korea 
was a threat, Japan crafted such legislation. Meanwhile, there was little 
progress in fulfilling the US desire to have Japan and South Korea cover 
the costs for light water reactors, and there was strong criticism of the 
Agreed Framework in the US Congress. Additionally, it was said that the 
prevailing view in the US was that the North Korean regime would 
collapse from within. Under these circumstances domestic and 
international conditions remained unmet, and ultimately the parties did 
not keep their promise under the Agreed Framework to provide light 
water reactors by 2002. In October 2002 the US declared the Agreed 
Framework cancelled.
Korean nuclear crisis （Ⅱ） 2002−2018
　During the fourth stage of the DPRK’s nuclear testing, which started in 
2002, the six─party talks were held. On September 17, 2002 the Japan─
North Korea Summit Meeting and the Japan─DPRK Pyongyang 
Declaration confirmed that the parties would observe all applicable 
international agreements to achieve a comprehensive solution to nuclear 
issues on the Korean Peninsula. The “six parties” are the US, South 
Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. In total nine meetings 
were held in Beijing from the first round in August 2003 to the sixth 
round in March 2007, but no meetings have been held since then. Due to 
space limitations, this article cannot discuss the course of the six─party 
talks or their failure. At a Japan─Russia summit meeting in April 2017, 
34　　早法 94 巻 4 号（2019）
President Putin proposed resuming the six─party talks, but Prime Minister 
Abe expressed a dismissive view. That December Moon Chung─in, a 
special advisor to President Moon Jae─in, proposed an idea for five 
country─talks involving China, Russia, Japan, the US, and South Korea, 
but excluding North Korea.
　What is the latest in the fourth stage of nuclear testing? It is perhaps 
the September 3, 2017 declaration that hydrogen bomb testing was a 
perfect success, which preceded the November 29 launch of the Hwasong
─5. North Korea performed a nuclear test at its Punggye─ri Nuclear Test 
Site in Punggye─ri Village, Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province. On 
that day the North Korean state─run Korean Central Television 
announced the perfect success of a hydrogen bomb test for arming 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was the sixth nuclear test since 2006. 
About one week later, on September 11, the UN Security Council 
unanimously passed a resolution on North Korea sanctions in which the 
US made a few concessions to gain the approval of China and Russia. The 
draft resolution included a complete ban on oil shipments to North Korea, 
and expressly permitted the use of “all necessary measures” by states 
when inspecting sanctioned vessels.
（38）
　Comment one on Test & Sanction: On October 9, 2006 North Korea 
conducts an underground nuclear test near the village of P’unggye. On 
October 14 The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1718. The 
measure imposes additional sanctions on commerce with Pyongyang, 
widening the range of prohibited transactions beyond those banned under 
Resolution 1695.
（39）
　Did North Korea break the law or violate other international obligations 
（38）　UNS/RES/2375, 11 September 2017.
（39）　Note 37. Chronology of U.S.─North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.
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in acquiring and testing nuclear weapons? A paper written by Matthew 
Liles is structured as a case─study in which he explores multilateral 
treaties and concepts of international law to determine if North Korea 
broke the law by testing a nuclear weapon. He takes up the issue of 
enforcement and, by doing so, argues that enforcement poses serious 
problems for the international community. The paper says that the non─
proliferation regime has failed. The disarmament movement in general 
has completely stopped, with the Russians and Americans halting the 
scheduled depletion of their nuclear arsenals. Although the new 
agreement, if carried out, would irreversibly set back North Korea’s 
nuclear weapon manufacturing program, it is only a stop─gap measure as 
one of the most schizophrenic nations on earth now possesses the 
capability to eradicate life en masse or to sell that capability to the highest 
bidder.
（40）
　 More than ten years passed since this paper described correctly that 
“the new agreement,” if carried out, is only a stop─gap measure.
　Comment two on Test & Sanction: On November 24, 2018 The UN 
Security Council issues a sanctions waiver to allow an Inter─Korean joint 
field study on connecting their railroads to go forward.
（41）
　On November 8, 2018, Reuters World News reported as follows: The 
Security Council has “unanimously boosted sanctions on North Korea 
since 2006… China and Russia have said the council should reward 
Pyongyang for the “positive developments” after U.S. President Donald 
Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met in June and Kim 
（40）　Liles, Matthew. “Did Kim Jong─II Break the Law ─ A Case Study on How 
North Korea Highlights the Flaws of the Non─Proliferation Regime,” 33 N.C.J. Int’
l L. & Com.Reg.103 （2007）.
（41）　Note 37. Chronology of U.S.─North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.
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pledged to work toward denuclearization. But the United States and other 
Western powers have said sanctions must be enforced until there is full 
denuclearization. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley has 
also accused Russia of cheating on U.N. sanctions on North Korea.
（42）
”
　“A U.S. congressional commission said on Wednesday that China 
appears to have relaxed enforcement of sanctions on North Korea and 
called on the Treasury Department to provide a report on Chinese 
compliance within 180 days.
（43）
”
　Reflections: In January 2018 my thoughts on the Korean nuclear crisis 
turned to whether is it possible that North Korea would freeze its nuclear 
testing and missile launches, and whether, additionally, the US and South 
Korea would freeze their joint military exercises. I focused on these two 
possibilities while examining the information and findings. Although it 
was a simple approach, I explored the pessimistic and optimistic views. 
Starting with the pessimistic view, there is North Korea’s military─first 
policy. When Kim Jong─il ruled the country, the DPRK was under the 
total direction and rule of the National Defense Commission, and the 
party’s leadership in particular was only nominal. The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute says that as of 2017 North Korea 
has between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that North Korea 
will give up this military expansion program. But the optimistic view 
holds that in the Kim Jong─un era, military decision─making has been the 
（42）　Nichols, Michelle. “Russia asks U.N. Security Council to discuss North Korea 
sanctions Thursday.” Reuters World News, November 8, 2018 （https://www.
reuters.com/article/us─northkorea─sanctions─un/russia─asks─u─n─security─council─
to─discuss─north─korea─sanctions─thursday─idUSKCN1NC2Q7）.
（43）　Brunnstrom, David. “China appears to relax North Korea sanctions: report to 
U.S. Congress,” Reuters World News, November 15, 2018 （https://www.reuters.
com/article/northkorea─usa─congress/china─appears─to─relax─north─korea─
sanctions─report─to─u─s─congress─idINKCN1NJ391）.
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province of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of 
Korea since the June 29, 2016 abolit ion of the National Defense 
Commission. What is more, there might also be some room to find a way 
out of difficulty via a new economic strategy of cooperation with China, 
Russia, and Japan.
（44）
　The US presents greater difficulties with respect to situation awareness 
and forecasting. The pessimistic view is that the neocons will place 
emphasis on Asia and guide a military strategy for global domination. In 
fact, it is said that within the Trump administration as well, financial 
interests, the military─industrial complex, and neocons are the dominant 
forces （note the National Security Strategy 2017, which uses the phrase 
“preserving peace through strength
（45）
”）. But for Trump, who holds fast to 
his “America first” policy, one option is perhaps an approach which adopts 
a flexible stance toward North Korea and alleviates the military base 
burden on South Korea, which is the optimistic view. It is important to 
transcend the simple pessimist─optimist formula, and to have the anti─
war/peace movement adopt a practical perspective which forcefully 
demands freezing or halting US─South Korean joint military exercises.
　The next question concerns the perception of nuclear weapons. Experts 
say that the hydrogen bomb is a second─generation nuclear weapon. 
Modernization of nuclear weapons has already resulted in the third and 
fourth generations, and their research and development are advancing 
further. North Korea has developed hydrogen bombs and ICBMs, but is 
still far below the level of the advanced nuclear powers.
（44）　McCormack, Gavan. “North Korea and a Rules─Based Order for the Indo─
Pacific, East Asia, and the World,” The Asia─Pacific Journal, 15 November 2017. 
Volume 15, Issue 22, Number 3 （https://apjjf.org/2017/22/McCormack.html）.
（45）　U.S.A. National Security & Defense. Issued on December 18, 2017.
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　There is also the prediction that the US will deviate from its previous 
nuclear deterrence strategy and carry out a North Korea bombing 
operation, but this is not very sensible. As such, could not one say that 
the North Korean nuclear crisis （Ⅱ） is just an illusory crisis?
（46）
　Third, efforts by the six─party talks to use China’s diplomatic and 
economic strength to impose sanctions on North Korea and deter it from 
developing nuclear weapons have failed. Strengthening such sanctions 
and further bolstering the missile defenses of South Korea and Japan are 
not sufficient conditions, and it would likely be impossible to gain China’s 
cooperation. Such being the case, an approach using economic, political, 
and diplomatic solutions that do not rely on war would indeed be the 
correct choice. Is it not the case that so far no one has tried proper 
diplomacy, and that the diplomacy employed until now has not been 
suitable for the North Korean regime?
（47）
　Fourth, what measures can be taken to resolve this dispute? The camps 
that constitute this dispute are, in terms of the Korean Peninsula’s 
geopolitical environment, the US, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan on 
one side, and North Korea, China, and Russia on the other. In terms of 
dispute─resolution objectives, the priority aims are: （1） Changing the 1953 
Armistice Agreement. North Korea has wanted to replace that agreement 
with a peace agreement, and negotiations for it should be first on the 
agenda. （2） Normalization of diplomatic relations. Embassies should be 
established in the US, Japan, and North Korea. （3） Denuclearizing the 
（46）　Mecklin, John. “Commentary: The North Korean nuclear ‘crisis’ is an 
illusion,” Reuters, September 12, 2017 （https://www.reuters.com/article/us─mecklin
─nkorea─commentary/commentary─the─north─korean─nuclear─crisis─is─an─illusion─
idUSKCN1BM2HA）.
（47）　Hecker, Siegfried S. “What to Make of North Korea’s Latest Nuclear Test?” 
（https://www.38north.org/2016/09/shecker091216/）.
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Korean Peninsula. Making this the precondition for negotiations ended in 
failure.
　It is important to set these three aims in order of priority and respect 
that priority. In trying to achieve a peaceful resolution, the first 
requirement is dialog without preconditions, not involvement by force. 
Actions taken should be the freezing of nuclear testing and missile 
launches by North Korea, and the freezing of US─South Korea joint 
military exercises. My vision was that these freezes will transition to total 
cessation through negotiations, and then further proceed to a peaceful 
structural transformation. Additionally, matters reached through 
negotiations would probably be effective if there were also UN 
inspections.
（48）
 And as the Preamble to The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition 
Treaty recognizes, these initiatives must be backed by broadening, 
sustainable cooperation between theory and movement ─ between 
experts and grassroots activists.
　Although my optimistic view is not necessarily fully realized now, it 
would be good to say here that I support the two Koreas request that the 
UN circulate the Panmunjom Declaration, and I hope their accord is 
realized. That holds also for the second Joint Statement of the US─North 
Korea summit in the near future. And my commentary shall proceed from 
the practical stance of betting on the hope that the agreements embodied 
in these diplomatic documents will be realized despite of any difficulty. At 
the same time, from an epistemological standpoint I shall seek the current 
state of and future outlook for the two Koreas, the Asian region, and our 
turbulent world in the context of the Panmunjom Declaration and the 
Joint Statement. Our next agenda will be an examination of some issues 
（48）　Galtung, Johan. “Trauma, Drama: What Does North Korea Really Want?” 
（https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJ_EGnLOAuY）.
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1. Global Nuclear Disarmament
Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament December 
2018
　“The only sure way to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons is 
to eliminate the weapons themselves,” says UN Secretary─General 
António Guterres.
（49）
 The Agenda considers nuclear weapons in the 
framework of “disarmament to save humanity.” Guterres calls for supports 
extending the norms against nuclear weapons, and in that regard appeals 
to States that possess nuclear weapons to affirm that a nuclear war cannot 
be won and must never be fought. The agenda proposes preparing for a 
world free of nuclear weapons through a number of risk─reduction 
measures.
（50）
　“Measures for elimination and destruction ─ terms most directly 
synonymous with ‘disarmament’ ─ have been employed at all levels, from 
weapons of mass destruction to landmines. They are pursued to 
accomplish many objectives, including to maintain stability, restore 
international peace and security, reduce the cost of military expenditures, 
uphold humanitarian principles and prevent armed conflict.
（51）
”
（49）　International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. September 
2018 （http://www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/）.
（50）　Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament. December 2018. 
Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, December, 2018 （https://www.un.org/
disarmament/sg─agenda）.
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　This Agenda for Disarmament continues: “The objectives and language 
of disarmament need to evolve together with our conceptions of security. 
General and complete disarmament, a term coined nearly a century ago, 
remains the ultimate objective of the United Nations in the field of 
disarmament. It is now critical for the international community to 
reconceptualize this fundamental goal so that disarmament actions, 
making use of all the measures available, clearly contribute to human, 
national and collective security in the 21st Century.
（52）
”
　“Today more than 14,500 nuclear weapons remain. Countries 
possessing such weapons have well─funded, long─term plans to modernize 
their nuclear arsenals… As of 2018, while the number of deployed nuclear 
weapons has appreciably declined since the height of the Cold War, not 
one nuclear weapon has been physically destroyed pursuant to a treaty. 
In addition, no nuclear disarmament negotiations are underway. 
Meanwhile, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence persists as an element in 
the security policies of all possessor states and many of their allies.
（53）
”
　“In recent years, there has been growing frustration amongst Member 
States regarding what is perceived as the s low pace of nuclear 
disarmament. This frustration has been put into sharper focus with 
growing concerns worldwide over the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences of the use of even a single nuclear weapon, let alone a 
regional or global nuclear war.
（54）
”
　Concerning an axiom that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never 
be fought, I think it is worth taking seriously the opinion written by Co─
（51）　Ibid. pp. 11─12.
（52）　Ibid.
（53）　International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, September 
26, 2018 （http://www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/）.
（54）　Ibid.
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Founder of Global Zero Bruce G. Blair, and Senior Advisor of Global Zero 
Jon Wolfsthal, in the Washington Post. They note that the resignation of 
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis “seems to be provoking unease, especially 
considering how dangerous our nuclear command arrangements are.” “It 
is well past time for the system to be reformed to ensure that it hews to 
our Constitution and mitigates as much as possible the very real risks 
associated with a renewed arms competition with Russia.” “Congress can 
and should prohibit any president from using nuclear weapons first. The 
incoming chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Adam 
Smith （D─Wash.）, proposed such legislation last year.” However, because 
I know how seriously American constitutionalism has been broken in the 
nuclear age, it sounds ironic to say, “Only laws can constrain such a 
dangerous prospect. It is well past time for our country to take control of 
the nuclear chain of command.
（55）
”
Let’s Stop Taking Doomsday to the Bank
　UN General Assembly Resolution 1653 says in part: “Any state using 
nuclear or thermo─nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the 
Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity 
and as committing a crime against ［hu］mankind and civilization.
（56）
”
　“One is the new B61 gravity bomb （model 12） now being developed by 
more than a dozen US companies that are gratuitously taking doomsday 
（55）　 Blair, Bruce and Wolfsthal, Jon. “Trump can launch nuclear weapons 
whenever he wants, with or without Mattis: No defense secretary can stop an 
impulsive president.” The Washington Post, December 23, 2018 （https://www.
washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/12/23/trump─can─launch─nuclear─weapons─
whenever─he─wants─with─or─without─mattis/?noredirect=on）.
（56）　UNRES1653 （XVI） 24 November 1961, Declaration on the Prohibition of the 
Use of Nuclear and Thermo─Nuclear Weapons.
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preparations to the bank.
　“The National Nuclear Security Administration hired the contractors 
to design, test, build and maintain the B61─12s （a gravity bomb dropped 
from fighter jets and heavy bombers）, set for mass production in 2020. 
The biggest weapons profiteers in the world are cashing in on the B61 
project. Addresses and phone numbers of the nuclear war grifters are 
listed below in case readers want to directly give them some grief. These 
are some of the nuclear holocaust hucksters.
（57）
”
The New Arms Race
SIPRI: Nuclear weapons are still being developed
　In its 2018 annual report, the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute （SIPRI） has criticized the ongoing development of new nuclear 
weapons. According to SIPRI, “14,465 nuclear weapons still exist, in the 
hands of just nine states: the US, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.” Of these, 3,750 were deployed with 
operational forces. “Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high 
operational alert,” says SIPRI. Although these are only nine countries, 
they do not intend to give up their nuclear weapons. “The vision of a 
world without nuclear weapons is history,” the annual report says.
（58）
（57）　LaForge, John. “Let’s Stop Taking Doomsday to the Bank,” Duluth Reader 
Weekly, Jan. 3, 2019. Some of the nuclear holocaust hucksters include Consolidated 
Nuclear Security Corp, Orbital ATK, Inc., Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sandia 
National Laboratory, Bechtel National, Inc., Honeywell, Integrated Technology 
Corp, Longenecker & Associates, Inc., and Lockheed Martin, et al. （http://
duluthreader.com/articles/2019/01/02/15594_lets_stop_taking_doomsday_to_the_
bank）.
（58）　Werkhäuser, Nina. “SIPRI: Nuclear weapons are still being developed,” 
Deutsche Welle （https://www.dw.com/en/sipri─nuclear─weapons─are─still─being─
developed/a─44266892）.
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　“The United States is investing a lot of money in the modernization of 
its nuclear arsenal. By 2026 it plans to have spent $400 billion （€344 
billion）. However, smaller countries like India and Pakistan are also 
engaged in a kind of “strategic arms race.” They are both developing new 
nuclear weapons and enlarging their production capacities for fissile 
material. Nuclear weapons thus remain a core element of the nuclear 
powers’ national defense strategies.
（59）
”
　“In view of the current tensions between the United States and 
Russia,” Shannon Kile, head of SIPRI’s nuclear weapons project, “says it 
is unclear how effective international agreements will be in future in 
controlling nuclear weapons.” “What concerns me at the moment is the 
fact that the political─strategic relationship between the United States and 
Russia has collapsed − and between them these two countries possess 92 
percent of all nuclear weapons,” he says.
（60）
　“This also affects arms control. When important disarmament 
agreements like the New START treaty expire in the coming years, 
nuclear weapons experts fear that new treaties may not be made to 




　“As a SIPRI expert, Kile has been observing the nine nuclear states for 
a long time now. He expressed surprise at one development in particular: 
the technical advances North Korea has demonstrated in its nuclear 
weapons and long─range ballistic missile tests in the past 12 months. He 
says it remains to be seen whether the meeting between the North 
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lead to North Korean nuclear disarmament.
　“I’m a bit skeptical about it,” he says, but adds that the meeting has 
opened the door for further trust─building measures.
（62）
”
Policy for Ploughshares Fund
　Since Donald Trump was elected two years ago, he “has called for new 
and more ‘usable’ nuclear weapons.” He wants to abandon key arms 
control agreements, “and Congress has been plowing ahead with a $2 
trillion shopping spree to rebuild the Cold War nuclear arsenal. There has 
been essentially no effective check on this excessive and dangerous 
spending,” Tom Collina, Director of Policy for Ploughshares Fund said.
（63）
　“Without real oversight, pro─nuclear bomb enthusiasts have had a free 
hand to promote Trump’s new ‘low─yield’ warhead for Trident missiles; to 
undermine crucial international agreements like the Intermediate─Range 
Nuclear Forces （INF） Treaty; and to push for high─cost missile, 
submarine and bomber programs that we do not need.
（64）
　“Once these programs get off the ground, they become too big to stop. 
If we don’t act soon, we will be locked in to an excessive Cold War─style 
arsenal for the next 50 years. As new US weapons are built, and Russia 
responds in kind, we will find ourselves back in an arms race that only 
defense contractors can win.
（65）
”
　Rep. Adam Smith （D─Wash.） “has introduced a bill to make it US 
policy to never launch nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Other bills 
（62）　Ibid.
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would prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons without congressional 
approval.
　“These fixes would put legal limits on the president’s ability to launch 
nuclear weapons unilaterally, without provocation, and would provide a 
tremendous safeguard to our democracy and our national security.
（66） 
”
2. International Crimes and Confidence Building
　UN Human Rights Committee: The threat and use of nuclear weapons 
are contrary to the right to life, and may amount to a crime under 
international law, says the UN Human Rights Committee. The clause 
devoted to nuclear weapons became paragraph 66 and reads as follows:
　66. The threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, in particular 
nuclear weapons, which are indiscriminate in effect and are of a nature to 
cause destruction of human life on a catastrophic scale is incompatible 
with respect for the right to life and may amount to a crime under 
international law.
（67）
　The International Court of Justice （ICJ）, “in its 1996 Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, confirmed the 
applicability of the right to life in time of armed conflict and, moreover, 
observed that the test of what is an “arbitrary deprivation of life” has to be 




　Second, the HRC considers nuclear weapons as indiscriminate in effect 
and of a nature to cause destruction of human life on a catastrophic scale 
and, therefore, incompatible with right to life. The ICJ, in its 1996 
（66）　Ibid.
（67）　Note 2, General comment No. 36 （2018）.
（68）　Note 3, ICJ Reports 1996, § 25.
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Advisory Opinion, stated that “［t］he destructive power of nuclear 
weapons cannot be contained in either space or time.”
　In the same line, the preamble of the TPNW reads as follows （par. 4）: 
“Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot 
be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave 
implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic 
development, the global economy, food security and the health of current 
and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and 
girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation…”
　“Third, the GC considers that use and threat of nuclear weapons may 
amount to crimes under international law,” writes Daniel Rietiker, 
Swedish professor of international law. “I explained elsewhere why I 
think that different provisions of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute may come into play regarding the use of nuclear 
weapons. I also suggest that such use could also amount to genocide, if 
denoting a specific intent to destroy, in whole or part, one of the groups 
mentioned in Article 6 of the Rome Statute.
（69）
”
　This message seems to have some sympathies in common, as we will 
see later, even though it deals with the threat of nuclear weapons instead 
of their use.
Statutes of the International Criminal Court （ICC）
　“The ICC already prohibits the use of weapons that would violate the 
rules on distinction and proportionality,” says Torbjørn Graff Hugo of 
（69）　Rietiker, Daniel. “Threat and use of nuclear weapons contrary to right to life, 
says UN Human Rights Committee,” November 7, 2018 （https://safna.org/2018/ 
11/07/threat─and─use─of─nuclear─weapons─contrary─to─right─to─life─says─un─human
─rights─committee/）.
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ILPI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction （WMD） Project. “An explicit 
reference to nuclear weapons use would create the impression that such 
use is not covered by the existing provisions in the ICC. In addition, such 
a move would constitute a legislative undertaking that might undermine 
the ICC’s legitimacy in the long run.
（70）
” He also says, “During the final 
rounds of negotiations of the Statutes in 1998, proponents of an inclusion 
contended that the use of both chemical and biological weapons were 
already prohibited under international law and that the use of nuclear 
weapons had been deemed to be ‘generally contrary to the rules of 
international law’ by the International Court of Justice in 1996.
（71）
”
　The proposal by several states and NGOs was eventually dropped. The 
failure to include any specific reference to any WMDs was openly 
lamented by a number of states, including Mexico.
（72）
 The first Review 
Conference of the Statutes was held in Kampala, Uganda in 2010.
（73）
 On 
November 2009 Mexico presented a draft resolution for an amendment to 
the Statutes, by which the use or threat to use nuclear weapons would be 
included in the definition of war crimes under Article 8 of the Statutes. 
Once again, however, the proposal received only limited support, and 
Mexico eventually withdrew the draft resolution as it became clear that 
consensus would not be reached.
（74）
（70）　Graff, Hugo Torbjørn. “The ICC & nuclear weapons,” Policy Paper No. 2/2012 
（http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1480#_ftn1）.
（71）　See Art. 105, （1）, E of the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ.
（72）　Including India, Mexico, Cuba, Sudan on behalf of the Arab group, Egypt, 
Bangladesh, and Benin. For a more detailed account of the process, see J. 
Burroughs （1999） （http://lcnp.org/global/icc.htm）.
（73）　The ICC Review Conference: Kampala 2010 and Off ic ial version of 
Aggression amendment （http://iccreviewconference.blogspot.com/）.
（74）　Cf. Nystuen, Gro, ed. Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014. This book has some pertinent chapters in Part Ⅲ 
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An Open Letter to the International Criminal Court
　Nevertheless, last year there was an open letter which claimed that the 
threat of nuclear weapons is a genocide conspiracy against North Korea.
　“In response to what in our considered opinion are criminal actions, Dr. 
Graeme MacQueen, Founder and former Director of the Centre For 
Peace Studies, at McMaster University, and I, felt it necessary to send the 
following Open Letter to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court on January 23 ［2018］.”
　“Embarrassment and shock at President Trump’s threats against North 
Korea have been widespread and have led to a serious discussion in the 
US as to whether Mr. Trump is mentally fit to govern. However, the 
threats of Mr. Trump and his secretary of defense go well beyond the US 
domestic sphere and have direct implications for other countries, 
including Canada.
　“Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
states that genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole of in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.”
　“Since there is clear evidence that the crime of genocide is being 
discussed openly and that plans are being made to carry it out against the 
people of the DPRK by US leaders and since, in these circumstances and 
with full knowledge of these threats and plans, US allies, including 
Canada, are cooperating with the US government and meeting to discuss 
actions to be taken against North Korea, and since these allies of the US 
appear to be ignoring international law, the Charter of the United Nations 
International criminal law: 8─Use of nuclear weapons as genocide, a crime against 
humanity or a war crime, 9─Use of nuclear weapons as an international crime and 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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and the Rome Statute, it is necessary that an investigation be conducted 
by your office to consider the evidence and to prosecute if there is 
evidence of a crime.
　“The United States of America is no longer a member of the ICC. 
However, it is bound by the Charter of the United Nations to keep the 
world peace, is party to the Genocide Convention, and was a sponsor of 
the International Criminal Court.”
　The authors then wrote: “We ask that the Office of the Prosecutor open 
an investigative file in this matter and, in addition, use your voice as 
Prosecutor and the moral imperative your office claims to represent to 
avoid genocide and to condemn as grave violations of international 




　While this open letter to the ICC will not be well─received by the 
people at large in the Western world, some people of the South might on 
the contrary welcome these activities and, in reaction to the suggestion 
that “we urge others to do the same,” be encouraged to take action in line 
with “trusting in the justice and faith of the peace─loving peoples of the 
world.”
Confidence building
　There are already several proposals for US─DPRK trust─building 
measures.
（76）
（75）　Black, Christopher. New Eastern Outlook, January 26, 2018 （https://journal─
neo.org/2018/01/26/the─genocide─conspiracy─against─north─korea─an─open─letter─to
─the─international─criminal─court/）.
（76）　SIPRI & CSS, Building Confidence on the Korean Peninsula,2007 （https://
www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRI07Korea.pdf）; Sokolsky, Richard, 
July 27, 2018 Commentary, Foreign Affairs （https://carnegieendowment.
Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Global Nuclear Disarmament: 
Some Issues on Law and Politics in the Nuclear Age（URATA）　　51
　North Korea says US must ‘completely eliminate’ its nuclear arsenal 
first as peace talks reach new low.
　“When we talk about the Korean Peninsula, it includes the territory of 
our republic and also the entire region of （South Korea） where the 
United States has placed its invasive force, including nuclear weapons. 
When we talk about the complete denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, it means the removal of all sources of nuclear threat, not only 




　On the other hand, President Trump says, “Kim said in a New Year’s 
Day address that North Korea would take a ‘new path’ in nuclear talks if 
the U.S. didn’t relax its sanctions. He also said he’d be willing to meet 
Trump again. The president ［Trump］ responded to a speech with a tweet 
focusing on the prospect of a second meeting.
（78）
”
　Having recognized the difficulty that these remarks show, I would say 
that the US─DPRK meeting has opened the door for further trust─ 
building measures. It is true that confidence building is essential, 
fundamental, and indispensable for a successful advance “to establish new 
US─DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the 
org/2018/07/27/road─map─for─demilitarizing─north─korea─pub─76941）; Choe Sang─
Hun, “U.S. Isn’t Holding Up Its End of Nuclear Deal, North Korean Envoy 
Charges,”August,4, 2018 （https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/asia/north─
korea─us─nuclear─deal.html）.
（77）　Withnall, Adam. “North Korea says US must ‘completely eliminate’ its nuclear 
arsenal first as peace talks reach new low,” The Independent, December 20, 2018 
（https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north─korea─us─talks─nuclear─
weapons─eliminate─disarmament─trump─kim─jong─un─a8692031.html）.
（78）　“President Trump Says North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Has Sent Him Another 
‘Great Letter,’” Time, January 3, 2019 （http://time.com/5492536/donald─trump─kim
─jong─un─letter/）.
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two countries for peace and prosperity.” The DPRK could feel the 
obligation “to commit to work towards the complete denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula.”
　Nevertheless, I know a distinguished scholar who proposed that 
“nuclear balancing would mean stability.
（79）
”
　Concerning this topic, a review by Campbell Craig of Cardiff University 
says that “Ken Waltz became preoccupied with the problem of nuclear 
war after 1979. Perhaps it was a kind of atonement for the rationale, and 
implications, of the Structural Realism he created.
（80）
”
　Although this remark on Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism does not 
legitimize the idea that “North Korea would take a ‘new path’ in nuclear 
talks” for maintaining its nuclear state policy, nuclear weapons exist in 
the hands of North Korea, along with eight other states: Israel, India, 
Pakistan, and the P5: the US, Russia, Britain, France, and China. 
Therefore, we would need to create new trust─building measures.
　I shall avail myself of a different opportunity to write about the 
international legal debate on trust─building measures, and about the 
aspects of a diplomacy which complies with the have─no─military Article 
9.
（81）
（79）　Waltz, Kenneth N. “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing 
Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4 （JULY/AUGUST 2012）, 
pp. 2─5 （https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012─06─15/why─iran─should─
get─bomb）.
（80）　Article Review Forum 59 on “How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and 
Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism.” September 9, 2016 （https://
issforum.org/articlereviews/59─waltz#Review_by_Campbell_Craig_Cardiff_
University）.
（81）　“Mahathir warns against revision of Japan’s pacifist Constitution,” Japan 
Times, September 29, 2018 （https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/29/
national/politics─diplomacy/malaysian─leader─mahathir─mohamad─warns─revising─
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3. Nuclear Arms Control Under Siege
　On October 20, President Trump announced the intent to withdraw 
from the INF Treaty. “It is important to preserve the INF Treaty and to 
extend or revise New START, which limits long─range nuclear forces and 
expires in 2021, so that an arms control structure remains in place 
between the US and Russia… Senators Merkley, Warren, Gillibrand, 
Markey, Wyden, Sanders, and Feinstein have introduced the Prevention 
of Arms Race Act of 2018 （S. 3667）. It erects several high barriers to 
spending on production of INF Treaty─violative missiles and declares a 
sense of the Senate that ‘President Trump’s announcement of the intent 
of the United States to withdraw from the INF Treaty, without proper 
consultation with Congress, is a serious breach of Congress’s proper 
constitutional role as a co─equal branch of government.
（82）
’”
　In October Jacqueline Cabasso, LCNP advisor, told to the First 
Committee of the UN General Assembly, “The United States has 
introduced a proposal called ‘Creating the Conditions for Nuclear 
Disarmament’ （‘the CCND approach’）.
（83）
” “But the US has it backwards. 
We advocate an approach we’re calling ‘Creating the Conditions for 
International Peace and Human Security’ （the CCIPHS approach） … 
The statement addresses US─Russian nuclear arms racing, the need to 
implement the multilateral agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program 
despite US violation of the agreement, and the potential for a solution 
japans─pacifist─constitution/）.
（82）　“The Right to Life Versus Nuclear Weapons,” International Association of 
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linking peace, development and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.
（84）
”
Proposal for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula
　Concerning the potential for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, I 
will introduce two proposals.
　The first is ICAN’s five steps to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. 
This proposal recognizes the risk of nuclear use and the unacceptable 
humanitarian consequences of such use. Secondly, it requires both the 
DPRK and ROK to reject nuclear weapons by joining the Treaty on the 
prohibition of Nuclear Weapons （TPNW）. Thirdly, under the TPNW, 
the DPRK would work with a competent international authority to 
develop and implement a time─bound, verifiable, and irreversible plan for 
the total elimination of its nuclear─weapon program. Fourthly, the CTBT 
is an essential and effective step in the denuclearization process, and 
CTBTO is pertinent in the verification of the closure of the DPRK test─
site. Fifthly, Once the DPRK’s nuclear─weapon stockpile is destroyed ─ 
i.e. once the DPRK’s nuclear weapons have been destroyed according to 
the disarmament plan negotiated in the context of the TPNW ─ the 
DPRK should rejoin the NPT as a non─nuclear weapon state.
　Because of the fact that this proposal was drafted before the US─DPRK 
summit, and in light of the Joint Statement, it seems inadequate to make 
any comment on trust─building measures, and therefore it lacks mention 
that the United States itself must commit itself to working towards the 
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
　The second proposal is The Peace Depot’s new project: “Toward a 
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Citizen’s Watch for a Fair 
Implementation of Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Agreements” （in 
（84）　Ibid.
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short: “Citizen’s Watch on the Implementation of Korean Denucleariza-
tion Agreements”） announced on Nov. 14, 2018. The project is meant to 
help successful implementation of the historic agreements for peace on 
the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
　This project has five phased benchmarks:
　Phase 1） DPRK: freeze of known nuclear arsenals, intermediate─ and 
long─range missiles, and related facilities
　US and ROK: declaration to end the Korean War and continued 
suspension of large─scale US─ROK joint military exercises
　Phase 2） DPRK: disablement of frozen facilities and acceptance of 
inspections for disablement
　US and ROK: acceptance of inspections of the ROK’s nuclear facilities 
and US military bases, and partial lifting of sanctions
　Phase 3） DPRK: declaration of nuclear arsenals, plutonium and 
enriched uranium stockpiles, and establishment of the DPRK liaison office 
in Washington, D.C.
　US and ROK: starting negotiations on a peace and nonaggression 
treaty, and establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, and 
further partial lifting of sanctions
　Phase 4） DPRK: submission of the comprehensive list of nuclear 
programs, and acceptance of inspections on requested sites
　US and ROK: conclusion of a peace and nonaggression treaty, and 
further lifting of sanctions
　Phase 5） DPRK: start ing dismantlement of nuclear weapons, 
intermediate─ and long─range missiles, and fissile material production 
facilities under international inspection, and establishment of the DPRK 
embassy in Washington, D.C.
　US and ROK: establishment of the US embassy in Pyongyang, and 
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lifting of all sanctions.
　My frank opinion on this proposal is that “US and ROK: establishment 
of the US embassy in Pyongyang, and lifting of all sanctions” and 
“conclusion of a peace and nonaggression treaty, and further lifting of 
sanctions” should come first.
Afterword
　Declaration by the Japanese government of North Korean statehood: 
What action should Japanese lawyers take concerning the normalization 
of Japan─North Korea relations now in the wake of the two summits 
between the two Koreas and between the US and North Korea?
　After the end of the Cold War on September 17, 1991, the two Koreas 
（the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea） 
were allowed to join the United Nations by a unanimous vote, including 
Japan, but even now the Japanese government does not recognize North 
Korea as a state, even while tacitly recognizing that North Korea 
effectively controls the territory north of the Armistice Line that bisects 
the Korean Peninsula. According to the government’s view, the reason for 
non─recognition is that although North Korea fulfills the conditions of a 
state under international law, it lacks “the will and capability to comply 
with international law.”
　But if one considers this in comparison with South Korea, it seems 
there was a pre─established decision not to recognize North Korea. That 
decision was excused with an unnatural explanation by foreign─affairs or 
legal bureaucrats. All of the 192 countries that Japan currently recognizes 
are deemed to have “the will and capability to comply with international 
law.” Why is North Korea an exception? At this point in time, 28 years 
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after North Korea joined the UN, it seems doubtful that there is any 
convincing rationale for this under international law. It seems to me that 
Japanese lawyers should at this time endeavor to have the Japanese 
government change its interpretation and application of positive 
international law pertaining to sovereignty, peace, and human rights.
The Constitution of Japan
　I would like to present my argument anew from the perspective of the 
Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the defeated nation of Japan from 
mainta in ing war potent ia l and does not recognize the r ight of 
belligerency. It also affirms that all the peoples of the world have the right 
to live in peace. Japan’s Constitution is an international instrument which 
pledges these things to not only the victor countries, but also the peoples 
of the war─victim countries. I shall present my view on the problems 
involved in the denuclearization and establishment of peace on the 
Korean Peninsula.
　Arriving late at the annual debates which began at the UN General 
Assembly on September 25, US President Trump stated, “We reject the 
ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism.
（85）
” The 
leaders of European and Mideast countries argued against him, while 
China and Russia forcefully headed him off.
（86）
 According to this article’s 
analysis, “America First” is a component of anti─globalism in the Global 
（85）　UN News. “US President Trump rejects globalism in speech to UN General 
Assembly’s annual debate,” September 25, 2018 （https://news.un.org/en/story/ 
2018/09/1020472）.
（86）　Horner, Rory, et. al. “How anti─globalisation switched from a left to a right─
wing issue − and where it will go next,” The Conversation, January 26, 2018 
（https://theconversation.com/how─anti─globalisation─switched─from─a─left─to─a─
right─wing─issue─and─where─it─will─go─next─90587）.
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North: “A big switch has occurred, and today’s backlash against 
globalization emerged from concerns about its impacts in the Global 
North.”
　In fact, the economic sanctions that the US has imposed on China 
should actually be called “economic war,” and it is perhaps correct to see 
the sanctions as part of the global strategy to tear down and rebuild the 
order for international cooperation, including the UN, which has been led 
by the US since after the Second World War. The act of “America─First” 
President Trump attending the UN General Assembly and delivering a 
speech should perhaps be, depending on one’s point of view, considered a 
“comedy.”
　As a matter of fact, by placing the task of denuclearization and 
establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula into the context of US─
China hegemonic competition, we can gain a certain awareness and try to 
find an historic solution. It is a logic which we can discern in the light of 
the history of the Chinese and Korean struggle of resistance against 
Western imperialism. The Japanese Empire, having weathered the 
political strife following the Meiji Restoration, chose the “Dump Asia, 
Join Europe” route and joined the Western imperialism camp. By this 
means Japan came to rule the Korean Peninsula and to infringe the lives, 
persons, and assets of the colonials. What is more, Japan treated the 
Koreans cruelly by robbing them of their pride with the “Create 
Surnames and Change Given Names” policy. With Japan’s loss in August 
1945, Japan’s imperial government and its support establishment should 
have discharged its colonial─rule responsibilities with respect to the 
resulting division of the Korean Peninsula and the ensuing Korean War, 
but the Allied leaders including Truman and Stalin, who had fought 
against the Axis powers of Japan, Germany, and Italy, concluded a 
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postwar resolution which did not question Japan’s responsibility for its 
colonial rule. During the Korean War the US, along with the UK, France, 
and other parties, concluded the Treaty of Peace with Japan in San 
Francisco. As such, the Soviet Union and China, as well as Britain’s 
colony India and other places, did not even sign the treaty. I shall 
mention in passing that Japanese intellectuals of the day called this “one─
sided peace,” and vigorously called upon the government to conclude 
“total peace.”
　Upon consideration, we should know that it was precisely the system 
created by the San Francisco Treaty, which excluded the USSR and 
China, that created the reasons why the interests and rights of the people 
who are the sovereigns of the Korean Peninsula are still not properly 
recognized. From this, one can see that liberation from what might be 
called “the yoke of San Francisco” remains to be done for both Japanese 
and Koreans.
　Here I shall narrow my focus to the matter of denuclearization and 
establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. To achieve this aim with 
diplomacy including economic sanctions but not military threats may, as 
geopolitical realists generally see it, be summarily dismissed as a mere 
optimistic hope. But it is a fact that the UN Security Council has 
repeatedly passed economic─sanction resolutions against North Korea for 
its nuclear and missile development. The hegemon behind those 
resolutions, however, is the nuclear superpower America, which leads the 
real world of nuclear weapons. The Trump administration rejects even 
the public stance of Trump’s predecessor Obama, which was to strive for a 
nuclear─free world, and it is engaging in a long─term nuclear arms race. 
Its military strategy regarding nuclear weapons is a “tailored deterrence 
strategy,” and it has declared that the US will make first use of nuclear 
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weapons even in conventional warfare including against enemies’ cyber 
attacks. One can find this in places such as Remarks by President Trump 
in State of the Union Address and Defense Secretary Mattis’ 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review. US scholar of peace studies Michael T. Klare says that “a 
twenty─first─century version of the Cold War （with dangerous new 
twists） has begun.” The long war against terrorism is drawing to a close, 
and the Pentagon has decided to undertake a “three─front geopolitical 




　However, I see no place in Klare’s article where he digs deeply into the 
war policy meant to bring about regime change in Iran. Concerning the 
US implementation of war policy for the current phase in which Iran is 
next after North Korea, one must, as Klare points out, delve into the 
annual posture statements of regional commanders in the Mideast.
　Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula has become a realistic project 
now that the 21st─century Cold War has begun. It is not simply a matter 
of denuclearizing North Korea; rather, it means making the Korean 
Peninsula into a nuclear─free zone, and includes the withdrawal of US 
forces in South Korea. This is clear from the press conference held after 
the signing of the US─North Korea Joint Statement. In other words, after 
Trump expressed his gratitude to South Korea’s President Moon Jae─in 
and to his professed friend, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe, who helped bring 
about the US─North Korea summit meeting, he stated that the agreement 
is beneficial to the world and to China. But then he said that Japan and 
South Korea will help foot the bill for denuclearization: “I think South 
（87）　Klare, Michael T. “Could the Cold War Return With a Vengeance?” Tom 
Dispatch, April 3, 2018 （http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176406/tomgram％3A_
michael_klare％2C_the_new_％22long_war％22/）.
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Korea will do it. I think China ─ I think, frankly, China will help out. I 
think that Japan will help out. No, I don’t think the United States is going 
to have to spend.
（88）
 However, it is especially noteworthy that he mentioned 
the suspension of US─South Korea military exercises and the future 
withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.
　Indeed, building peace in Northeast Asia, and further, pursuing peace 
and prosperity in Eurasia and the world will not happen without hope. 
But at the same time, it would also be possible that Trump’s America First 
doctrine will be pushed aside by the globalism of Trump’s three─G 
administration.
（89）
　And yet, the multitude
（90）
 seeks a reason for living. And as long as the 
multitude seeks that, people must have human dignity and the hope of 
survival because they cannot live if they discard them. I want to foster the 
thinking that wagers on the fiction of this hope.
（88）　“Who Will Pay for N. Korea’s Denuclearization?” Chosunilbo, June 4, 2018 
（http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/06/04/2018060401675.html）.
（89）　“Three Gs: Generals, Goldman and Gazillionaires ─ Incoming Trump 
Administration the Richest in History,” Jiji Press, December 14, 2016 （https://blog.
goo.ne.jp/raymiyatake/e/90534a0ddef55e7f0846c0549b714f68） （in Japanese）. The 
three Gs refers to Trump administration officials being chosen from generals, 
Goldman Sachs, and gazillionaires. Three persons each were chosen from former 
generals and Goldman Sachs.
（90）　Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age 
of Empire, Penguin Books, 2005.
